År 1999.
29 Oktober overflyver to russiske SU-25 kampfly, "Ivanov" og "Petrov" en
konvoj (ca. 12 km. lang) af civile flytninge, der bevæger sig væk fra
Grozny i Tjetjenien.Ved overflyvningen mener piloten i det ene fly
at kunne se tjetjenske oprørere gemt i en KAZ-lastbil, der skjuler sig
blandt de civile flytninge og piloten beder flytårnet om tilladelse til at
åbne ild. Det får piloten og begge vender rundt og bomber den
civile konvoj hvor bl.a. 6 civile dør.
Den Europæiske Menneskerettighedsdomtol fandt dette i strid med
artikel 2 jvf. dom af 24. feb. 2005
(Case of Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v. Russia
Applications nos. 57947/00,57948/00 and 57949/00)
Tænk hvis nogle af Israels handlinger kommer for Haag-Domstolen.
Specielt kunne jeg godt tænke mig at se en domstol tage stilling til
bombningerne af Røde Kors bygninger samt skoler, vel og mærke bygninger
Israel havde GPS-koordinaterne på.
"Israel retsforfølges måske for Gazakrig"
http://www.dr.dk/Nyheder/Udland/2009/01/14/172105.htm
Her er hvad EMD udtalte om militær magtanvendelse i
forbindelse med sagen
"Case of Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v. Russia",
hvor det bl.a. slås fast, at der skal udvises proportionalitet
i magtanvendelse :
"a) General principles
168. Article 2, which safeguards the right to life and sets out the
circumstances where deprivation of life may be justified, ranks as
one of the most fundamental provisions in the Convention, from
which in peacetime no derogation is permitted under Article 15.
Together with Article 3, it also enshrines one of the basic
values of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe.
The circumstances in which deprivation of life may be justified must
therefore be strictly construed. The object and purpose of the
Convention as an instrument for the protection of individual
human beings also requires that Article 2 be interpreted and
applied so as to make its safeguards practical and effective.
169. Article 2 covers not only intentional killing but also the situations
where it is permitted to "use force" which may result, as an unintended
outcome, in the deprivation of life. The deliberate or intended use
of lethal force is, however, only one factor to be taken into account
in assessing its necessity.Any use of force must be no more than
"absolutely necessary" for the achievement of one or more of the
purposes set out in sub-paragraphs (a) to (c).
This term indicates that a stricter and more compelling test of necessity
must be employed than that normally applicable when determining
whether State action is "necessary in a democratic society" under
paragraphs 2 of Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention.
Consequently, the force used must be strictly proportionate to
the achievement of the permitted aims."
----
En lille indskydelse:
Den sidste sætning i ovenstående taler NETOP om proportionalitet
ved magtanvendelse.Vi tager den lige igen:
"Consequently, the force used must be strictly proportionate to the
achievement of the permitted aims."
Den sætning kan så sammenlignes med udtalelser fra politikere,
der mener, at tale om proportionalitet i krig er noget nonsens.
Ak og ve, den slags udtalelser viser blot selvsamme politikers
ignorance. Ingen nævnt, ingen glemt.
----
"170. In the light of the importance of the protection afforded
by Article 2, the Court must subject deprivations of life to the most
careful scrutiny, taking into consideration not only the actions
of State agents but also all the surrounding circumstances.
171. In particular, it is necessary to examine whether the operation was
planned and controlled by the authorities so as to minimise, to the greatest
extent possible, recourse to lethal force. The authorities must take
appropriate care to ensure that any risk to life is minimised.
The Court must also examine whether the authorities were not
negligent in their choice of action
(see McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of
36 ISAYEVA, YUSUPOVA and BAZAYEVA v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT
27 September 1995, Series A no. 324, pp. 45-46, §§ 146-50 and p. 57, § 194,
Andronicou and Constantinou v. Cyprus, judgment of 9 October 1997,
Reports 1997-VI, pp. 2097-98, § 171, p. 2102, § 181, p. 2104, § 186,
p. 2107, § 192 and p. 2108, § 193 and Hugh Jordan v. the United Kingdom,
no. 24746/95, §§ 102 - 104, ECHR 2001-III).
The same applies to an attack where the victim survives but which, because
of the lethal force used, amounted to attempted murder (see, mutatis
mutandis, Yasa v. Turkey, cited above, p. 2431, § 100;
Makaratzis v. Greece [GC], no. 50385/99, § 49-55, 20 December 2004).
172. As to the facts that are in dispute, the Court recalls its
jurisprudence confirming the standard of proof "beyond reasonable doubt" in
its assessment of evidence (Avsar v. Turkey, no. 25657/94, § 282, ECHR
2001). Such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong,
clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of
fact. In this context, the conduct of the parties when evidence is being
obtained has to be taken into account (Ireland v. the United Kingdom
judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25, p. 65, § 161).
173. The Court is sensitive to the subsidiary nature of its role and
recognises that it must be cautious in taking on the role of a first
instance tribunal of fact, where this is not rendered unavoidable by the
circumstances of a particular case
(see, for example, McKerr v. the United Kingdom (dec.),
no. 28883/95, 4 April 2000). Nonetheless, where allegations are made
under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention the Court must apply a
particularly thorough scrutiny (see, mutatis mutandis, the Ribitsch v.
Austria judgment of 4 December 1995, Series A no. 336, § 32,
and Avsar judgment, cited above, § 283) even if certain domestic
proceedings and investigations have already taken place".
Ingen dobbelt-standard, tak.
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Ulige skal behandles ulige, for at være lige.
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Ulige skal behandles ulige, for at være lige.